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This paper examines and conceptualizes the process underlying the diffusion of a 
back office messaging system connecting the financial transaction activities of fund 
houses in Europe and banks in Taiwan. Drawing on the theoretical notions of 
rhetorical practice and technological frame, it develops a socio-cognitive process 
framework to conceptualize how the articulation of rhetorical situations and the 
deployment of rhetorical strategies influence stakeholders’ sense-making towards a 
new technology. A conceptual framework is developed to enhance understanding of 
technology diffusion by taking into account the dynamic interplay between rhetorical 
practice and technological frame. We show that the persuasive power of rhetorical 
practices is largely influenced by (i) the rhetors’ on-going advancement of local 
knowledge, assumptions and beliefs, and (ii) an effective deployment of a balanced 
rhetorical strategy to promote the technology to different stakeholders. We 
demonstrate that analysis of rhetorical practice helps to explain how the phenomenon 
of diffusion is linguistically afforded and discursively constructed into a reality.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: technology diffusion, technological frame, rhetorical practice, 
interpretive case research. 
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The need for and importance of communication between stakeholders is key in 
affording the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 1995). While prior studies have 
provided insights into the testing and theorizing of communicational aspects of 
diffusion (Mann, et al. 2011; Robertson, et al. 1996; Swan and Newell 1995; Wang et 
al. 2013; Zaffar et al. 2014), few have challenged the assumption that values 
underlying a new technology can be universally communicated, understood and 
accepted by all stakeholders (Green 2004). One exception is the “technological frame” 
perspective, which emphasizes the process and dynamics involved in making sense of 
a new technology being considered (Allen and Kim 2005; Davidson 2002; Olesen 
2014; Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Accounts using this perspective argue that the 
process of diffusion is essentially to socially contest and construct a shared 
understanding of, and thereby give meaning to, the new technology. The shared 
meaning given to the new technology is not something embedded in it, but emerges 
from it through the social interaction of relevant stakeholders as diffusion ensues1. 
Despite the undoubted usefulness of the technological frame concept, however, what 
is relatively under-emphasized in the extant literature is how meaning contestation 
and construction is influenced by rhetorical practice (Barrett et al. 2013; Berente et al. 
2011; Huang et al. 2013).  
 
As a distinctive type of communication, rhetoric and its enacting practice – commonly 
termed “rhetorical practice” – provides a theoretical foundation for the study of the 
instrumental use of persuasive language and discourses (Cheney et al. 2004; Sillince 
2005). This theorizing is often applied in the context of implementing and 
institutionalizing innovative solutions and processes (Barrett et al. 2013; Green 2004; 
Huang et al. 2013; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Two conceptual components, 
namely “rhetorical situation” and “rhetorical strategy”, form the basis of rhetorical 
practice (Cheney et al. 2004). A rhetorical situation symbolizes the context of 
rhetorical practice, while the rhetorical strategy is the approach by which rhetorical 
practice is exercised to achieve an intended result; in this case, with respect to giving 
meaning, and leading to the diffusion of, a new technology. That rhetorical practice 
plays a key part in the shaping of a technological frame, and a technological frame 
can serve as a temporal representation of rhetorical practice, notwithstanding, few 
accounts have thus far applied the two concepts in conjunction (Barrett et al. 2013). 
Doing so allows for the extension of the technological frame perspective to account 
                                                     
1 In this sense, there is a certain emergent quality emanating from the meaning arising from the fusion 
of the material artifact and its perceived use, taken together – somewhat akin to the concept of 
sociomateriality popularized in recent times by, inter alia, Orlikowski (2007); Orlikowski and Scott 
(2008); Leonardi and Barley (2010), Leonardi (2012), and Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. (2014). 
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for the impact of managerial reasoning and actions in responding to a rhetorical 
situation related to technology diffusion. Additionally, this integrative theoretical 
approach offers an analytical tool by which to examine how “frame resonance” 
(Kaplan 2008) is achieved (or otherwise) amongst different stakeholders. The concept 
of frame resonance is used here to refer to how technology champions mobilize 
different rhetorical practices to achieve consensus amongst stakeholders in terms of 
the underlying perceptions of the new technology. Analyzing frame resonance is 
important because a lack thereof is likely to deter or inhibit the diffusion process 
(Green 2004).  
 
In this paper, we provide a synthesis of the current literature in order to develop a 
conceptual framework that provides a means to interpret the diffusion of a new 
technology. The strengths of the interpretive case study approach in examining 
rhetorical practice and technological frames are well documented (Olesen 2014; 
Pozzebon et al. 2006; Zbaracki 1998) and the rationale underlying the selection of this 
approach in this instance is outlined later in this paper. The setting is the financial 
sector, and more specifically centers on the attempt by European fund houses and IT 
vendors to implement a back office messaging system in order to automate mutual 
fund transactions between European fund houses and Taiwanese banks. This system 
became known to practitioners in the financial industry as straight-through-processing 
(STP). In this paper, we consider the diffusion of this new system from 2000, when 
discussions on STP began in earnest, to mid-2010, when the field study ended. 
 
Echoing the need to incorporate rhetorical practice in the theorizing of IS research 
(Huang and Galliers 2011), our aim in undertaking this field study was to enhance 
understanding of technology diffusion by taking into account the importance and 
influence of rhetorical practice on technological frame and frame resonance. We trust 
that this research, through its application of concepts of rhetorical situation, rhetorical 
strategy, frame repertoire and frame resonance – and their dynamic interplay – will 
afford an enrichment of the theoretical landscape of technology diffusion, and 
potentially, of IS development more generally. Our account will also hopefully 
contribute to the theorization of the socio-cognitive process of collective sense-
making in the context of technology diffusion.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing the technology diffusion 
literature and explaining the value of rhetorical practice in addressing the limitations 
of the existing literature. We then introduce the perspective of rhetorical practice as 
the theoretical foundation for this study. The section that follows describes the 
research methodology and the context in which this technology diffusion took place. 
Empirical findings and analysis are then presented. We conclude with theoretical and 
practical implications, as well as outlining few future research directions.  
 
Theoretical foundations and conceptual framework 
Largely influenced by the seminal work of Rogers (1995), current conceptualizations 
of technology diffusion have yielded valuable insights to enrich the theoretical 
landscape of user acceptance of information technology (e.g., Lanzolla and Suarez 
2012; Venkatesh, et al. 2003; Zaffar et al. 2014). In the theorization of technology 
diffusion, two distinctive foci are clear. First, when examining technology diffusion at 
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the individual level, constructs, such as relative advantage, compatibility and 
voluntariness of use, play key roles in shaping individuals’ perception and decisions 
(Agarwal and Prasad 1997; Moore and Benbasat 1991; Sia, et al. 2004; Wu and Wang 
2005). Second, when investigating technology diffusion at the collective level, a 
network’s structural characteristics, such as a firm’s partnerships (Hong and Zhu 
2006) and buyer-supplier relationships (Iskandar, et al. 2001), and various social 
networks (Zaffar et al. 2014), such as professional associations (Swan and Newell 
1995), together with opinion leadership (Kroes et al. 2011; Samutachak and Dekui 
2012) and institutional factors (Hertwig 2012), can significantly influence both 
anticipated and unanticipated diffusion outcomes.  
 
Even though communication is fundamental in shaping perceptions and decisions at 
individual and collective levels, what is communicated, such as the meaning of the 
new technology, and how the communication process is enacted amongst different 
stakeholders during diffusion, are rarely examined in their own right. Green (2004: 
653) notes that, “discourse shapes decisions about the adoption and wider diffusion of 
managerial practices”. He argues that rhetorical practice is the essential mechanism by 
which actors generate and associate meanings with respect to an innovation. 
Rhetorical practice is the vehicle through which actors socially construct their 
identities in relation to the surrounding world (Billig 1996; Morrison et al. 2013; 
Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). To legitimize an innovation amongst its stakeholders, 
rhetorical practice should provide “discursive reasons for actions” (Green 2004: 654). 
Moreover, as noted by Sillince et al. (2001: 1422), argumentation and justification 
behind an IT investment decision is politically charged and highly context dependent.2  
 
Our main theoretical assumptions about how people shape their acceptance or 
rejection decisions in relation to a new technology are related to rhetorical practice, as 
described in the work of Cheney et al (2004). In their view, rhetorical practice through 
social interaction “deals with contingencies, uncertainties and ambiguities” (ibid: 82), 
and consists of two related elements: the articulation of the rhetorical situation and 
deployment of the rhetorical strategy. Cheney and colleagues use this concept to 
emphasize the relational nature of rhetorical practice in contrast to that of agenda 
setting: conceiving rhetoric as a discursive display that depends solely on the skills 
and abilities of the rhetor – the person who initiates the rhetoric (Eccles, et al. 1992). 
For them, rhetorical practice is a sense-articulating and meaning-making practice by 
which shared understanding of and consensus regarding the situation being 
encountered by both rhetor and audience is socially constructed, negotiated, accepted, 
and in many cases, rejected. Beyond its socially constructed nature, the Cheney 
framework has the virtue of integrating different insights from other prominent 
researchers who have focused on rhetorical practice in relation to the creation and 
contestation of shared meanings, such as Bitzer (1980); Crable and Vibbert (1986); 
Fairclough (1989); Czarniawska-Joerges (1994), and Weick (1995). The rationale 
behind our choice of their account of rhetorical practice as a basis for our synthesis of 
                                                     
2 Sillince and his colleagues used the institutional changes within the UK National Health Service as an 
example of how rhetorical practice acts as a force in altering participants’ perceptions towards the 
legitimacy of a proposed solution. 
5 
 
this literature is twofold. First, their account focuses on how sharing understanding 
and consensus are contested and constructed through the day-to-day practices of 
relevant stakeholders, rather than on the pure linguistic meaning of the deployed 
rhetoric. Second, due to their ontological positioning, their account emphasizes the 
importance of social-cognitive processes that are fundamental to the theorization of 
collective sense-making and framing (Berente et al. 2011; Davidson 2002; Kaplan 
2008; Olesen, 2014). In our study, this has particular resonance since one of our main 
theoretical premises is that, even though values afforded by the new technology are 
key decision criteria, the socio-cognitive process (such as a participants’ framing and 
sense-making), also plays a fundamental role (Davidson 2002; Kaplan 2008; Mishra 
and Agarwal 2010; Olesen 2014; Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Weick 1995).  
 
For a rhetorical practice to be persuasive – in the context of this study, for the vendor 
to influence the banks’ commitment to the new technology – a rhetor needs to 
construct the “rhetorical situation” and devise and deploy a rhetorical strategy to 
present their rhetoric to the target audience. According to Cheney et al. (2004), a 
rhetorical situation reflects the rhetor’s understanding and interpretation of the 
contingencies and the solutions that are proposed to address them. Referring to the 
typology of Benford and Snow (2000), the contingencies are a type of “diagnostic 
frame”, while the solutions symbolize “prognostic frames”. Kaplan (2008) argues that 
diagnostic and prognostic frames are important in their own right, but that it is equally 
important to ensure a level of congruence between the two. According to Sillince 
(2005, p. 608), congruence refers to the level of “fit among contingencies, structure 
and strategy”. In other words, a good diagnosis of the contingency can fail to achieve 
its persuasive value if a poor solution results, and vice versa. Thus, congruence is not 
just a quality relevant to the rhetorical situation, but also to the rhetorical strategy 
(Sillince 2005). Further, for a rhetorical strategy to reach a desirable level of 
congruence, the rhetor needs to blend and balance two complementary strategies, 
namely, strategies associated with differentiation and with integration (Sillince 2005). 
Sillince argues that a differentiation strategy aims to surface and address localized 
assumptions and differences, while an integration strategy aims to project a unified 
picture by which benefits can be achieved through collective actions.  
 
The level of congruence in relation to both the rhetorical situation and the rhetorical 
strategy depends on the way the rhetor constructs and presents them, as well as on 
how the audience perceives and processes them. In addition to the rhetorical situation 
and strategy presented by the rhetor (what), and the means by which they are 
presented (how), stakeholders draw on their past experiences, existing expertise and 
understanding – “frame repertoires” in Kaplan’s (2008) terms – to evaluate the 
rhetoric. Kaplan argues that, when the levels of congruence are well aligned with the 
audience’s frame repertories, “frame resonance” occurs. Thus, when the level of 
frame resonance is high, stakeholders are more likely to commit. In contrast, when the 
level of frame resonance is low, stakeholders are mostly likely to defer their decision 
or reject the technology altogether. Information about these decisions, regardless of 
whether they accept, reject or defer, is collected by the rhetor to determine whether 
further rhetorical practice will be required. As shown in Figure 1, rhetorical practice 
occurs in a recursive manner. In Figure 1, we use the arrows to indicate (i) a 
processual view of rhetorical practice and (ii) how the result of a rhetorical practice 
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can influence rhetor’s approach towards their audiences. Initially, the rhetor puts 
forward his/her view of the rhetorical situation to the intended audience, based on the 
rhetorical strategy that is perceived to be appropriate. The degrees of congruence, 
both in the rhetorical situation and the strategy, affect the level of frame resonance on 
which the audience bases their decisions in conjunction with their frame repertories. 
Once commitments are made, stakeholders can become a source of “rhetorical 
resource”’ (Jarzabkowski, et al. 2010) on whom the rhetor can draw, in particular, 
initiating a new rhetorical practice with a view to persuading non-adopters. However, 
under the condition that the rhetors fail to persuade the adoption decision, they might 
continue another process of rhetorical practice by potentially altering different 
elements previously deployed. The following section outlines how Figure 1 is 
operationalized in our research process.  
 




Our study employs an interpretive case approach (Pan and Tan 2011; Walsham 1995). 
The strengths of interpretive case studies are well documented 3  (Davidson and 
Chismar 2007; Pan and Tan 2011), in particular for investigating meanings and reality 
that are socially constructed (Walsham 1995), embedded within natural settings 
(Orlikowski and Lacono 2001), and intertwined with practices and consequences of 
participants’ social actions (Pawlowski and Robey 2004). Due to the need to examine 
the phenomenon of diffusion over time (Rogers 1995), our research design is 
longitudinal in its orientation, in particular to understand how changes in rhetorics and 
their related practices unfold. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the data collection 
and analysis process can be significantly shaped by the researchers’ preconceptions 
(Walsham 1995). Thus, the concept of rhetorical practice served as a ‘sensitizing 
device’ (Klein and Myers 1999) to guide the interpretation of stakeholder actions and 
events throughout this study.  
 
Research context: The Taiwanese offshore fund industry4 
Since the strong economic growth period of the 1980s, the Taiwanese government 
began a series of financial reforms to facilitate the growing demand for accessing 
overseas investment opportunities. In 1983, the government amended the Securities 
and Exchange Act to allow the offering of domestic mutual funds by local banks, 
securities brokers and securities investment enterprises. Since the 1990s, several 
economic and political factors contributed to the emergence and growth of offshore 
funds in Taiwan, as offshore funds appeared to be a safer investment alternative 
compared to the domestic stock market. To this day, offshore funds continue to attract 
the interest of investors and the active promotion of offshore alternatives on the part 
                                                     
3 Different approaches and paradigms for IS research are explored in, for example, Galliers et al., 
(2007). 
4 See for example: ‘Taiwan mutual fund history’ http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/2/9/8/n214028.htm 
and ‘Mutual fund product and business practices’ (Fubon Investment Trust Company, 2007).  
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of financial advisors.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
Field data collection took place between 2008 and early 2010, during which time we 
reviewed historical documentation covering the whole decade. We conducted 50 
individual face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with thirteen distributing banks (28 
interviews), three fund houses (6 interviews), three global software providers (11 
interviews), and two domestic IT vendors (5 interviews). Bank and fund house 
interviewees were those directly involved in business areas where STP could or have 
been used in their respective organizations. For example, our interviewees from the 
bank were managers from the trust department or the IT department.  At the outset of 
the data collection process, we contacted the bank managers through the introduction 
of the global STP provider. Additionally, by attending fund automation conferences, 
we were able to identify and get to know potential interviewees. To secure interview 
access, we agreed to provide feedback arising from our field observations at an 
industry workshop and various meetings. Typically, interviews lasted more than 90 
minutes and were tape-recorded and then transcribed. All interviews were conducted 
in Mandarin, except for those with the global STP providers and fund houses, which 
were conducted in English. Those interviews conducted in Mandarin were translated 
into English following transcription. Research notes were taken during each interview, 
following on-site observation, and as a result of informal dialogue. In addition to 
individual interviews, we participated in meetings and conferences, including four 
Asia Fund Automation Consortium (AFAC) meetings where managers from the fund 
houses met and discussed the STP strategy. We also attended a number of fund 
automation conferences and one industry workshop. Additionally, we accumulated a 
wealth of documentary data, including e-mail correspondence with practitioners; 
letters between practitioners regarding the establishment of a consortium; conference 
presentation materials; meeting minutes; newsletters, and press releases about STP 
training and diffusion.   
 
Our data analysis consisted of four steps, notably summarizing, clustering, displaying 
and comparing the collected data (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991) by applying the 
conceptual framework proposed earlier. Two of the researchers went through each 
interview transcript, document and field note to summarize the key points. The 
summarized data were then clustered. The clustering process afforded us the means to 
analytically identify areas of data leading to the surfacing of key themes. Based on 
Figure 1, we displayed the key events chronologically (Table 1). After the underlying 
storyline was established, we reviewed our data once more to ensure that we had not 
missed out any key points vital for our conceptualization.   
 
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
 
The chronological display of the three phases led to the identification and further 
analysis of three rhetorical situations. These three situations represent three distinctive 
sets of rhetorical practices within which different combinations of rhetorical situations 
and strategies were deployed by the rhetors to influence STP diffusion. Synthesizing 
different stakeholders’ views and responses to each of the three rhetorical situations 
and comparing how they evolved over time provided the basis for us to assess the 
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degree of congruence (or lack thereof) amongst the local banks. The final step in the 
research process was to validate our findings by independent review of the empirical 
data by each of the co-authors and via feedback obtained through our interactions 
with practitioners at the workshop and other meetings. 
 
Case findings 
The following case narrative describes the phases of STP diffusion in the Taiwanese 
banking industry during the period under study. As noted, we do so through the 
analysis of the three rhetorical situations that we identified, utilizing the theoretical 
framework (summarized in Figure 1). That is, for each rhetorical situation, we 
examine (i) how a group of rhetors (i.e., fund houses and global vendors) developed 
their diagnostic and prognostic frames, and articulated the corresponding 
differentiation and integration strategies; (ii) the audience's (i.e., the Taiwanese banks 
involved) frame repertoires, and (iii) the degree of congruence and frame resonance 
and its impact on the progress of (STP) diffusion. The transition from one rhetorical 
situation to another symbolizes the development of a new rhetorical situation and the 
associated rhetorical strategies to address the outcomes that rhetors failed to achieve 
previously. These transitions serve as useful indicators of the occurrence, or the lack 
thereof, of the Taiwanese banks’ frame resonance. The lack of frame resonance is 
particularly salient in explaining situations where some of the local banks were able to 
understand the functionalities afforded by STP, but did not fully accept the benefits 
projected by the rhetors. We now articulate the introduction and diffusion of STP 
during the first decade of the 2000s in the three phases – rhetorical situations – 
outlined above.  
 
Phase one: 2000-2003 – Resistance 
The development of an offshore fund industry in Taiwan led to challenges with 
respect to the existing manual fund processing practices. The growth in fund size, 
together with the volume of transactions, became a major driver in the push for 
automation. With mounting volumes and increasing turnover, the Asian fund offices 
were facing pressure from their European headquarters to automate their processes 
through STP, primarily for two reasons. First, STP was seen as a means of reducing 
the need for manual intervention and avoiding human error (e.g., missing faxes or 
mistakes due to unclear hand-writing). As one fund house manager put it: 
 
“... it’s difficult sometimes to tell the difference between the number 0, 6 and 
9. And it’s very easy to receive a paper that’s smudged. In these cases, a lot 
of time will be wasted in communicating and confirming the content of the 
fax.” 
 
Second, the fund houses perceived STP as facilitating improved information 
processing efficiency and achieving cost savings in the distributing banks. One of the 
fund house managers indicated that:  
 
“In Europe, the majority of funds are [managed] in Luxemburg and Dublin. 
[Here], labor is expensive and in short of supply. Therefore, STP is a good 
way to increase efficiency and save costs. For us, to implement STP in Asia 
costs nearly nothing technology-wise since our European office already has 




Thus, from the early 2000s, various fund houses began to contact their respective 
distributing banks about the possibility of implementing STP. As an example, the fund 
houses’ Asian offices in Hong Kong started working with AutoP (a pseudonym given 
for confidentiality reasons) around this time. AutoP focuses on global market 
infrastructure products that standardize financial messages and has a regional office, 
also in Hong Kong. AutoP had been working with the global fund industry with a 
view to gaining agreement on ISO 200225 standards and market practices for mutual 
funds since the early 2000s. Many banks in Taiwan are AutoP clients. Given this 
already established relationship, AutoP believed that securing Taiwanese banks’ 
commitment to STP should be straightforward. The rhetoric put forward by AutoP 
placed a strong emphasis on the role and potential of STP as the solution for service 
transformation. One of the AutoP managers informed us that: 
 
“In Taiwan, you have about 38 banks. For retail wealth management, you 
need to have a good revenue stream, and save costs. STP is a long-term 
winner here. [But] in Taiwan, we have learnt that cost saving is not the 
ultimate argument for implementing STP. [It’s more to do with] client 
services ego. For example, each bank wants to be become a Citibank in 
wealth management. You won’t achieve that if you’re still manually 
processing your fund service. The idea is that you catch up or fall behind”.  
 
The approach taken by AutoP was to target the distributing banks individually by 
conducting company visits. As the Regional Head of AutoP put it: 
 
“In the beginning, you need to start with an individual company visit. You 
can then understand how each company works, and who’s responsible for 
what decisions, and [who has] power. You need to get the right person to 
participate in the working group, otherwise, it won’t work.”  
 
While AutoP and the fund houses had been actively promoting STP, reactions from 
the bank managers we interviewed suggested that there were still concerns, ranging 
from a lack of sufficient justification to inertia in introducing changes. For instance, a 
bank manager noted that: 
 
“Our bank ... [enjoys] strong competitive advantage [through] low capital 
costs … Because of our low capital costs and unique customer groups, we 
have no urge to implement STP. Banks are in the business of selling credits, 
so conservative thinking is embedded in top management’s mentality. 
[There’s] no desire to compete to be number one in the market. Secure 
operational stability is the priority”.  
 
Despite three years’ effort on the part of AutoP and the fund houses, and for the kind 
of reasons identified above, there had been not a single commitment made by any of 
the distributing banks to accept STP. 





Phase two:  2003-2006 – Reassessment and changed tactics 
The lack of commitment to STP during the first phase called for a reassessment and 
change in tactics on the part of AutoP and the fund houses. As one of the fund house 
representatives commented:  
  
“There are several issues here. For instance, the head of the trust department 
doesn’t want to spend money. They’re on a cost cutting strategy; they’re even 
taking out ATMs! The mentality right now is to minimise existing costs. But 
one day I believe the bank will be caught out as volume grows back again. 
They’ll lose customers because others are ahead in providing a better value 
proposition to customers”.  
 
As a result, AutoP began launching a series of activities to promote STP, including the 
formation of the Taiwan Fund Operation Group (TFOG) in 2003, and the AutoP Fund 
Masterclass conference in 2004. The main rationale behind forming TFOG and 
organizing the conferences was to target key banks in a concentrated effort to market 
STP. In addition to the conferences, TFOG was formed with the agenda to “discuss 
operational issues, business cases, and market practices for the Taiwan market”. In 
preparation for the conference series, AutoP identified the banks that they thought 
might be interested in STP from their client list and also contacted the relevant 
professional associations, including the bank association, the securities investment 
trust and the consulting association. Participation was free. The conferences placed 
considerable emphasis on promoting the benefits of STP. The key selling points 
included, primarily, cost-efficiency, standardization and risk reduction. To strengthen 
the message, AutoP invited speakers from Europe, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
Thus, AutoP, as well as some of the fund houses, focused on involving the leading 
banks and positioning STP as a fashionable innovation that leading – “progressive” – 
Taiwanese banks should embrace. Thus, instead of targeting all the distributing banks 
in Taiwan, AutoP adopted a more selective approach, inviting only a small number of 
banks to form TFOG. The idea was to have some of the leading banks set the 
example, with other banks hopefully following suit. Commenting on AutoP’s 
approach, one of the bank managers outside TFOG told us:  
 
“... AutoP was very selective as to which companies they picked to 
participate. The salesperson started by talking to each of the distributing 
banks. He listened to the views [expressed] and then he picked the favourable 
ones.”  
 
In addition to AutoP, the fund houses were keen to see banks in Taiwan implementing 
STP as already noted. In addition to actively participating with AutoP and TFOG in 
discussions regarding transaction standards, seven fund houses decided to form the 
Asia Fund Automation Consortium (AFAC), in 2006. A statement from AFAC 
indicated that the consortium is “committed to driving the STP initiative within the 
Asia Pacific fund industry”. The significance of forming AFAC was explained by one 




“Having seven fund houses together, we’re very powerful in dictating the 
standards about automating fund processing in Asia. As for the latecomers, 
they’ll just have to follow the standard. With standardization, technology 
testing with fund house becomes a process, not a pain”.  
 
In order to persuade the first bank (called Innovbank for the purposes of this case 
study) to implement STP, AutoP and its local IT partner provided preferential 
treatment as an added incentive. This was expected by Innovbank and included the 
development of a more customized STP system in line with the bank’s particular 
requirements. In late 2004, AutoP and Innovbank began to discuss the details of 
implementation and transaction data standardization. However, it was not until 2006, 
when Innovbank’s STP went live.  
 
Although the diffusion of STP took much longer than AutoP had anticipated, their 
efforts, together with those of the fund houses, helped to enhance local banks’ 
awareness of the importance of automation in general terms, and STP’s role more 
specifically. In contrast to the previous phase, where the understanding of STP and its 
potential benefit was very limited, during this phase there was increasing awareness 
of STP and improved capability on the part of local bank managers to evaluate its 
suitability.  
 
Phase three: 2006-2010 – Following the leader but changing the story 
STP going live at Innovbank in 2006 was an important milestone – a turning point in 
influencing other banks to consider the system. By the end of 2010, there were five 
banks – including Innovbank – that had implemented STP. All were using the system 
sold by AutoP. The second case was in 2007, two banks went live in 2008, and one at 
the beginning of 2009. During this phase, AutoP and the fund houses continued their 
efforts to promote STP at conferences and in client visits. However, one of the most 
distinctive changes in AutoP’s approach was to invite the IT director of Innovbank to 
become an advocate, influencing other banks to implement STP. Innovbank’s IT 
director was not only a regular speaker at the conferences but also a main source of 
insightful experiences regarding the implementation of STP.  
 
Having a highly respected local bank adopting STP was crucial in persuading other 
banks to follow suit. First, STP was perceived as a result to be suitable for the local 
context, having been properly tested and tailored for the Taiwanese market. This was 
viewed as making implementation easier, as common formats and standards had 
thereby been created. Also, time taken to test the product was seen to have been 
reduced, given the on-going improvements that had occurred at Innovbank. Second, 
the local IT vendor, given its experience with Innovbank, had developed in-house 
know-how in implementing STP, thereby shortening the learning curve. Third, the 
Innovbank experience had reduced the fear of many local bank managers: they would 
no longer be seen as a “guinea-pig”, and the IT executives concerned had a ready-
made case to help them in gaining support from senior management. 
 
Notwithstanding that the feasibility of STP having been demonstrated by Innovbank, 
securing the support of senior management remained a struggle. For example, the IT 
director of NewTaiwan, the second case and main competitor of Innovbank, had been 
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considering implementing STP prior to 2006. As he argued, it was not in light of the 
perceived benefits of STP that gained the support of top management. Rather, it was 
Innovbank’s implementation that triggered NewTaiwan to follow: 
 
“For us, efficiency is everything. Clearly, being a private bank, 
competitiveness and quick response to market change, such as the use of STP 
by our competitor, are our main concerns.”  
 
The third case, Leadbank, was the only one amongst the five that had the scale and 
volume to potentially justify the cost of implementing STP. Nevertheless, Leadbank 
managers indicated that the successful implementation of Innovbank had helped to 
show to their top management that STP was a relatively risk-free solution: 
 
“It was around the first quarter of 2008, when the fund business was 
blooming that our department started to realize the need for automation. 
Besides, there’s always a need for every department to set their annual goal 
for process reengineering and new business development; STP … came in to 
fulfil that purpose. We were lucky to initiate the project when business was 
still good at the time … Having a local bank using STP, we were able to show 
our boss that STP was a risk-free solution ... [and] things went quite smoothly 
during the implementation.”  
 
The rhetoric mobilized by the fourth case was very different to the rhetorics presented 
by the rhetors and other organizations. One of the managers from the fourth adopting 
bank, Pearlbank, indicated that:  
 
“With our traditional emphasis on international trade, IT was rarely on the 
top management’s agenda. To get the go-ahead, the business case for STP 
was presented as being a critical element in enabling our internationalization 
strategy.”  
 
As the last of the five cases, managers in the trust department of Earthbank suggested 
that they had been waiting for a number of years for the “right time” to put forward 
the business case for STP to the bank’s top management. The “right time” came as the 
result of a handling error. According to the STP project manager at Earthbank: 
 
“In one incident, an order of NT$4 million was mistakenly put as €4 million 
by one of our staff. Based on the exchange rate between NT$ and €, we’re 
talking about 45 times the difference in value! Even though the error was 
spotted later by another department, we knew that it was the type of error we 
couldn’t afford to make. Clearly, it won’t be the only type of error that can 
happen to us.”  
 
The business case proposed by the Earthbank’s trust department had thus shifted from 
the technological features and economic benefits of STP to the importance of 
avoiding human error. As with the other banks, and as noted by the Earthbank project 
manager:  
 
“Justifying the cost-benefit of STP can rarely make financial sense ... Most 
top managers might not necessarily fully appreciate this [human error] 
13 
 
justification. They are, though, aware of the need to avoid operational risks, 
which can cost far more to correct.”  
 
Despite the fact that the process of implementing STP had become less complicated 
than anticipated, the benefits arising from the system were also perceived to be more 
limited than that which had been promised. As one manager put it:  
 
“Transaction flow is still the same – not much difference has occurred. We ... 
only need to make the order, and for the rest we rely on the system. However, 
not all fund houses are ‘live’, so we still need to handle the paperwork for 
those who haven’t automated. [Having said that, while] transaction flow 
might not have changed much, time saving is the biggest benefit”.  
 
According to many of the bank managers we interviewed, the pricing structure of STP 
remained the most critical bottleneck, not just for banks currently using STP, but also 
for those that were still considering of implementing it. The STP pricing model was 
being continuously negotiated between AutoP and the various banks – even with 
some of the existing adopters – notwithstanding AutoP’s unwillingness to 
compromise on further price reductions. Given these kinds of concerns, and as 
already noted, there were just the five organizations implemented STP in Taiwan as 
our study came to an end in early 2010.  
 
Discussion 
In this section, and in line with the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 1, our 
discussion focuses on an interpretation of the rhetorical situation and rhetorical 
strategies identified in each phase.  
 
Phase one – Resistance  
Although promoting the diffusion of STP had started before 2000, more systematic 
efforts came into being when the fund houses joined forces with AutoP to engage the 
local banks in rhetorical practice early in 2000. At this point, diagnostic frames 
commonly shared by the fund houses were reflected in their encounter with increasing 
transaction costs and low levels of process efficiency, due to the need for human 
intervention in the then trading process. Unsurprisingly, encouraging local banks to 
embrace STP as a means of cutting costs and improving process efficiency 
characterized the fund houses’ collective prognostic frames. The fund houses’ 
rationale for selecting AutoP as the provider of STP resulted from the existing 
relationships AutoP had with the local market. From the perspective of AutoP, the 
rhetorical situation was not so much about exploring new relationships with local 
clients. Rather, the emphasis was on disseminating the benefits of STP to secure the 
local banks’ commitment.  
 
Initially, STP was projected by the rhetors as a means of automating the fund trading 
process, or at least key parts of the transaction. Even though the rhetoric of AutoP and 
the fund houses in highlighting the potential of STP had been well understood by 
many of the distributing banks, very few were fully convinced about this as a 
justification for considering the system. This lack of congruence was illustrated not 
only in the rhetorical situation articulated by the rhetors in justifying the need for STP, 
but also in the rhetorical strategy deployed. For instance, fund houses had commonly 
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perceived the problems of high cost and the lack of operational efficiency as being 
caused, in the main at least, by the absence of automation in Taiwanese banks. Hence, 
their intended solution was simply to convince local banks to implement a system 
(STP) that would provide a means of automating the process. The differentiation 
strategy deployed by AutoP, and endorsed by the fund houses, yielded very little in the 
form of intended results. This was partly related to local banks’ perceptions of AutoP 
as the provider of FOREX messaging services, which are typically used for the 
trading of foreign currency, as well as AutoP’s lack of understanding of the banks’ 
generally negative attitudes towards diffusing new practices or technologies.    
 
Three distinctive yet interrelated areas are particularly relevant in explaining the lack 
of frame resonance between the rhetors and the distributing banks. First, when STP 
was associated with automation, the persuasive power of the automation rhetoric was 
relatively weak so far as the local banks were concerned. As demonstrated, with 
regard to automation, what seemed beneficial to the banks was the saving of man 
hours. In a society where labor costs are trivial compared with the cost of acquiring 
and using STP, it was not so surprising that the persuasive power of the automation 
rhetoric was far too weak to secure support: none of the distributing banks had 
managed to win a business case based on the automation argument, even during the 
later phases. Second, even though many of the local banks understood the potential 
afforded by STP, few considered the fund houses’ collective agenda to reduce their 
operating costs as something that they should address urgently. Third, many bank 
managers expressed concerns about their own organizations’ risk-avoiding cultures 
and lack of interest in initiating what were seen as IT-related changes.     
 
Although no bank in our study had rejected STP out of hand during the first phase, no 
bank had decided to implement STP either. Notwithstanding, the rhetoric of 
automation in relation to STP did have some impact on the local banking community. 
During this first phase, the rhetoric of automation was attractive to many back office 
managers who were struggling with the ever-growing volume of fund trading 
transactions. For them, automation was a concept that was most relevant and urgent. 
However, the rhetorical practice behind STP did not provide them with the level of 
frame resonance necessary to gain commitment from their senior management. This is 
reflected in the cases of implementations, as well as some of the banks which decided 
not to go ahead with STP. Indeed, their continuing interest and representations served 
as a catalyst for AutoP and the fund houses to rethink and rework their rhetorical 
practice, as this phase unfolded.  
 
During the latter part of this phase, we saw that the diagnostic and prognostic frames 
that the rhetors were articulating drew heavily on European experiences and 
perspectives in relation to STP practices. This led to the enactment of a differentiation 
strategy as a key aspect of the rhetorical situation. In particular, by blaming 
inefficiencies in the transaction process as being simply due to the absence of 
automation in Taiwanese banks, it was understandable that the differentiation strategy 
failed to gain sufficient support from and congruence with the local community. The 
lack of consensus amongst local banks concerning STP proved to be too much of a 
barrier for STP diffusion to actually occur at this stage. It is clear that the rhetors’ 
differentiation strategy was based on a perceived value of STP that was centered in 
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the European context, but failed to take into account the local business agenda and 
priorities. This led to a very low level of frame resonance between the European fund 
houses and the Taiwanese banks, and as a result, no commitment to implement was 
observed during this period.  
 
Phase two - Reassessment and changed tactics 
During the second phase, there was considerable evidence to suggest a switch in 
rhetorical practice to address the lack of congruence and relatively low level of frame 
resonance that characterized the first phase. The switch was reflected in the rhetors’ 
assessment of the rhetorical situations and the modification of rhetorical strategy in 
light of this assessment. As reflected in the rhetors’ diagnostic frames, the rhetorical 
situations portrayed a mixed picture. From AutoP’s point of view, the lack of 
commitment to STP was due mainly to the limited understanding of benefits 
associated with STP, and partly due to the risk-avoiding culture evident in the local 
market. From the fund houses’ perspective, limited willingness to embrace STP was 
due mainly to the local banks’ reluctance to make financial investments for process 
improvements. Given that a lack of understanding with regard to STP’s benefits was 
perceived as one of the main barriers, at least from AutoP’s point of view, the 
prognostic frame is illustrated by the series of conferences and company visits made 
by AutoP and the fund houses in order to counter this rhetorical situation. 
Additionally, the rhetoric concerning the value of STP was also refined. In addition to 
its association with automation, as reflected in one of the objectives of establishing 
TFOG, STP was now projected by AutoP and the fund houses as a strategic tool for 
service transformation, which implied a higher cost to justify its value. Compared 
with the earlier phase, when STP was projected as a necessity for local banks to play 
their part in the modern (efficient) trading process, the new rhetoric injected a more 
nuanced view of STP, portraying the system as a means to survive and compete in the 
international market.  
 
The rhetorical strategy had also undergone certain refinements during this phase. An 
attempt was made by AutoP and the fund houses to incorporate some degree of 
integration into their new rhetorical strategy. For instance, the organization of TFOG 
was key in reinforcing a more integrative approach amongst some of the leading 
banks in Taiwan than had been the case in the previous phase. By intending to use 
TFOG as a showcase for STP, the underlying rhetorical strategy was about using the 
selective-integrative approach amongst the elite banks in the local market. Such an 
approach was designed to project STP as an exclusive solution for only the selected 
leading banks in Taiwan. However, what seemed to contribute most significantly to 
the level of congruence in rhetorical strategy, for the local banks not involved in 
TFOG as well, was the formation of AFAC. Given that the full potential of STP could 
only be achieved once the number of users grew, the formation of AFAC held certain 
symbolic importance to all concerned. In addition to the fund houses’ willingness to 
work together towards standardization, it also showed that improving the efficiency of 
fund trading was not just the problem of the local banks, but all those involved in the 
trading process.      
 
Referring to Figure 1, we see that the growing balance between the enactment of the 
differentiation and integration strategies combined contributed to increased 
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congruence amongst some of the local banks. Even though many banks found 
themselves to be still unable to commit to STP during this phase, cases, such as 
Pearlbank and Earthbank, had become more aware of what might be the barriers in 
their own organizations. The improvement in frame resonance was particularly visible 
regarding considerations as to how STP could be introduced, if certain conditions 
(e.g., setup and running costs) could be improved. In comparison to the previous 
phase, during which STP’s usefulness and diffusion feasibility remained in doubt, 
there were growing feelings of acceptance towards of the system, and on-going efforts 
on the part of local bank managers to champion STP in their organizations. During 
this phase, there was also a clear split between the local banks that were actively 
considering STP and those that were not, as reflected in the participation of TFOG. 
Given the costs involved in implementing and running STP, many argued the business 
case was still not justified, while others began to relax their opposition. In either case, 
while expensive, STP had become a better-understood and appreciated technology. 
The implementation of STP in Innovbank was clearly a turning point, especially in the 
generation of additional rhetorics from the perspective of the leading distributing 
banks, as we saw in phase three.  
 
Phase three – Following the leader but changing the story 
The third phase not only saw changes in rhetorical practice, but also in the number of 
rhetors involved, with the active involvement of the IT Director of Innovbank. One of 
the themes reflected in AutoP’s and the fund houses’ diagnostic frame during the 
second phase was the local banks’ general concern about not becoming a “guinea-pig” 
of STP. The emergence of a local bank that had implemented STP clearly helped in 
overcoming such fears. The significance of including Innovbank into AutoP’s rhetor 
team was more than merely a demonstration of the feasibility of STP diffusion. It 
generated a rhetoric concerning the diffusion of STP from the viewpoint of a local 
bank – not only that of foreign institutions, such as AutoP and the European fund 
houses. This marked a crucial shift in the diagnostic frame of AutoP and the fund 
houses. Instead of continuously promoting the benefits of STP as a means of 
increasing efficiency in a global context, they approached the rhetorical situation 
more in terms of a local affair, offering a local solution. Having Innovbank on-board 
to share their experiences with other banks helped not only to legitimize the 
prognostic frame of AutoP and the fund houses, but also to achieve a higher level of 
congruence with the diagnostic frame. 
 
Capitalizing on Innovbank’s case, AutoP and the fund houses also modified their 
rhetorical strategy to ensure a more balanced approach than in the previous two 
phases. What seems to have been particularly convincing during this phase was that 
STP had become a tested solution that worked in the Taiwanese market. The localized 
rhetorical strategy began to generate more positive responses from local banks. With 
Innovbank as the first case, other banks perceived the risks of being a ‘guinea pig’ to 
have been reduced. The sharing of Innovbank’s experiences within the local 
community evidently stimulated more adoptions. Not only were there a growing 
number of adopters, however: the general level of understanding of STP and of the 
potential implications of implementation also improved. As a result of the higher 
degree of congruence in rhetorical practice, there was not merely a higher degree of 
frame resonance (given the banks’ understanding of STP), but also a stronger 
17 
 
commitment towards actual commitment. Even for the banks which decided not to 
implement STP, it was clear from the case narrative that their decisions were no 
longer related to a lack of understanding of what the solution could or could not 
afford. Indeed, several IT managers and heads of trust departments were highly 
interested in STP. However, in several cases, they were also very aware that 
implementing STP was unlikely to be supported in their own organizations, mainly 
due to cost considerations.    
 
Without Innovbank’s case, the story of STP diffusion in Taiwan could have been very 
different. The emergence of a first case was a significant tipping point in the diffusion 
of the technology, as evident in the other four banks. Equally important, however, was 
the presence of different rhetorics to which the followers were exposed. In other 
words, while AutoP and the fund houses were the key early contributors to the STP 
discourse, the richness of the rhetoric was added to and revised by Innovbank and the 
later cases – and even those decided not to implement STP.  
 
The creation and refinement of the rhetorical repertoire in the local fund trading 
community served two essential roles in enhancing the level of frame resonance 
shared by local banks. First, the repertoire became a source of inspiration for later 
implementation cases. Having said that, to successfully argue the case for 
implementation, it is not just the content of the rhetoric that matters. It is also about 
how the rhetorics are put together to gain support from top management. The 
storytelling within the network of banks was a crucial mechanism to achieve this 
support. Second, the repertoire can be seen as a window that reflects the changes in 
understanding of, and the agenda relating to, STP. For instance, when AutoP first 
introduced STP to the Taiwanese market, the key selling points emphasized aspects of 
cost efficiency, standardization and risk reduction. Even though the underlying 
concept of standardization (and its importance to a distributing bank’s operation) was 
addressed by AutoP from the outset, few banks were fully aware of the implications. 
The experiences of the five cases contributed – partially at least – to a growing 
awareness of the importance of standardization and integration throughout the local 
industry. The dissemination of this awareness is reflected in later discourses that had 
clearly moved on from the rhetoric of automation to a more sophisticated justification 
to implement in terms of, for example, ensuring operational excellence and managing 
risk. Growing understanding of STP is not just about what STP can do but also about 
what it cannot do. Given that there are 71 offshore fund houses offering 976 types of 
offshore funds to Taiwanese investors (as of November 2009), to connect all the fund 
houses with all the distributing banks is clearly far too ambitious for any single 
vendor to consider. 
 
In sum, we have noted changes in the frame repertoires of the rhetors and their 
audiences arising from the on-going interaction and refinement of rhetorical practices 
during the first two phases we identified. These symbolized not only the rhetors’ 
efforts in addressing the lack of congruence between the rhetorical situation and 
strategy, but also led to an important increase in the degree of frame resonance. The 
turning point may be seen as Innovbank’s implementation of STP, since its 
involvement led to the diagnostic and prognostic frames becoming more relevant to 
the local financial community. Having gradually come to appreciate the varying 
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attitudes of the local banks, the rhetors also began to balance the use of a strategy of 
differentiation and integration. This alignment between the rhetors and their audience 
(i.e., AutoP and the fund houses vis à vis local banks) resulted in the sharp increase in 
STP diffusion, albeit amongst a small number of leading banks, within a relatively 
short period of time between 2008 and 2009.   
 
Conclusion and Implications  
Our findings suggest that improving our understanding of the rhetorical practice 
amongst different stakeholder groups is one approach to increasing our understanding 
of the complexities involved – both practically and theoretically. Our study is not 
without limitations of course. Generalizability in a statistical sense (Walsham 1995) is 
lacking as with all interpretivist studies. Nevertheless, we have actualized the essence 
of “generalizing from description to theory” (Lee and Baskerville 2003: 235) in this 
particular setting. We now specify our four distinctive yet interrelated theoretical 
contributions.  
 
First, drawing on the perspective of rhetorical practice permits us to consider the 
discursive quality of sense-making by which meaning and interpretations around the 
introduction of a new technology are collectively developed by stakeholders as 
negotiated rhetorical practice. Indeed, the very notion of rhetorical practice – or 
practices – leads us to consider future research that brings together the rhetorics 
associated with notions of strategy-as-practice and micro strategizing in the context of 
information systems strategizing and information technology diffusion, along lines 
similar to those that were recently argued by Peppard et al. (2014) and Whittington 
(2014). 
 
We believe that this novel approach to sense-making in general, and technological 
frames more specifically, is particularly relevant when interpreting situations where 
decision makers’ understanding of a technological solution (in this case, STP), was – 
initially at least – very limited. It is this lack of understanding about the technology 
that gave the vendors and other stakeholders (e.g., the fund houses), room to be 
creative in their rhetorical practice, given that they were dealing with a blank canvas.  
 
Second, our conceptual framework allows us to capture and conceptualize the process 
and patterns by which frames are formed and shifted through the influence of 
rhetorical pursuits. As noted in prior studies (Davidson 2002; Olesen 2014; 
Orlikowski and Gosh 1994), technological frames can limit opportunities and 
alternative options available to actors, as these frames serve as filters in the processing 
of information. Our findings recognize the limitations imposed by these technological 
frames. Nevertheless, it is also clear from our findings that some stakeholder groups 
were able to intentionally modify and reshape these frames to achieve their intended 
outcomes. By taking into account these linguistic considerations, we are able to enrich 
the existing theorization of the socio-cognitive approach, in particular with regard to 
the notion of technological frames, by adding the influence of rhetoric in shaping 
commitments and the wider diffusion of technological solutions. The way by which 
stakeholders manage the technological frames can also be perceived as institutional 
entrepreneurial process (Henfridsson and Yoo, 2014). Future research will benefit our 
understanding by examining institutional entrepreneurship in conjunction with 
19 
 
rhetorical practice and technological frame in the context of technology diffusion. 
 
Third, even though prior accounts (e.g. Huang et al. 2013; Morrison et al. 2013; 
Sillince 2005) have highlighted the importance of rhetorical congruence, our 
understanding of how to analytically assess it remains under-developed. By 
synthesizing some of the key accounts, we are able to establish a conceptual tool, as 
shown in Figure 1, to address this issue. By individually examining (i) the rhetorical 
situations articulated by the rhetors, (ii) what the rhetoric strategy was developed (iii) 
the relationship between rhetorical situation and strategy and (iv) how the audiences 
responses, we are able to yield an integrative assessment the degree of rhetorical 
congruence. By mapping the rhetorical situations chronologically, we were able to 
show how the degree of rhetorical congruence changes over time, or, as in our case, 
how the lack of congruence was addressed. The degree of rhetorical congruence 
cannot be judged based simply on how widely a new idea or technology is diffused in 
a local context, as suggested by Green (2004). It can be equally problematic to assume 
that accomplishing rhetorical congruence will always lead to positive result, as 
indicated by Sillince (2005). As shown in our study, even though achieving 
congruence does not necessarily warrant acceptance and subsequent diffusion, a lack 
of congruence does not necessarily mean the rejection of a new technology, either. 
Assessing the degree of congruence helps us to appreciate the relational, emergent and 
subjective nature of the socio-cognitive process and its impact on the trajectory of 
technology diffusion. Despite of our contributions, few questions related to the 
assessment of rhetorical congruence are yet to be addressed. Future research can 
emphasize on the following questions. For instance, what criterion and frames do the 
participants deploy to assess technology champions’ projected rhetorical situations 
and rhetorical strategy? How would participants raise their concerns when the degree 
of congruence is perceived to be low?” 
 
Fourth, this research extends the existing theoretical landscape of the socio-cognitive 
perspective on technology diffusion by adding an inter-organizational dimension to 
the analysis. While the influences of external sources have been frequently addressed 
in the diffusion of new and fashionable managerial practices (e.g., Abrahamson, 1996; 
Newell et al., 2000), our understanding of how organizations in the same industry 
collectively make sense of a technological innovation remains limited, albeit that 
some research has taken place with respect to the perceived usefulness of a 
technology in relation to internet banking, for example (Cheng, et al., 2006; Lai and 
Li, 2005). We extend current thinking on diffusion by providing empirical insights 
into how stakeholder organizations (in this case, IT vendors, fund houses and 
competing banks), somewhat discursively it must be said, constructed and negotiated 
the values, practice and limitations of STP. By spanning our inquiry over a period of 
nine years, we capture the on-going changes in interpretation as evolving as the 
rhetorical context evolves. By considering sense-making at the inter-organizational 
level, we contribute to the current debates by illustrating how uncertainties may be 
discursively stabilized across organizations, somewhat akin to the “social contagion” 
notion of Messerschmidt and Hinz (2013). 
 
Fifth, we believe that our approach may also be useful to explore how industry-wide 
discourse on new information technologies – what Swanson and Ramiller (1997) term 
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an organizing vision – may enter and influence the discourse within organizations, 
thus helping to unpack the phenomenon of technology diffusion. In this regard, we 
consider this approach adds value to the technology diffusion literature in that it 
provides an analytical tool to identify the contextual elements that may prove relevant 
to frame shifts in the early stages of the diffusion process. In particular, future 
research can investigate how diagnostic and prognostic frames are shaped, understood 
and absorbed.  
 
In the introductory section of this paper, we made the point that the shared meaning 
given to the new technology emerges through the social interaction of relevant 
stakeholders as the diffusion of that technology ensues. We cited some of the recent 
work on sociomateriality (e.g., Leonardi, 2013; Leonardi and Barley, 2010; 
Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowksi and Scott, 2008) in making the point that there is 
emergence arising from the meaning given to the fusion6 of the material artifact and 
its perceived use, taken together. This is an important point that extends the current 
debate on sociomateriality (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014). As with socio-technical 
systems (Leonardi, 2012), extant research that applies sociomaterial concepts does so 
in relation to the use and impact of information and communication technologies in 
and between organizations. Here, we note that such thinking may usefully be 
extended in relation to the perceived future use of that technology, whether or not the 
stated rationale for the new technology turns out to be the case or not. Despite the 
growing interest in the use of sociomaterial concepts in Information Systems research, 
this line of enquiry may be argued to be at a pre-pubescent stage still. Future research 
should apply such concepts to technologies pre- and during diffusion in order to yield 
deeper understandings of how technologies do – or do not – become diffused, and 
shed further light on the applicability of sociomaterial concepts more widely in our 
field.  For example, new empirical insights may be gained in relation to why it is that 
organizations (people) accept or reject a particular technology (Leonardi, 2009), and 
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Table 1: Timeline of STP adoption in Taiwan 
Time  Major Event 
2000 STP initiative started to develop in Europe 
2003 Formation of Taiwan Fund Operation Group (TFOG) 
2004 1st Automation & Solution Workshop held in Taiwan 
2006 Formation of Asia Fund Automation Consortium 
Adoption of STP solution by Innovbank 
2007 Adoption of STP solution by NewTaiwan 
2008 Adoption of STP solution by Leadbank 
Adoption of STP solution by Peralbank 
Adoption of STP solution by Earthbank 
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